Met uw toestemming gebruiken we privacyvriendelijke, beperkte analyses om te begrijpen welke onderzoeksroutes werken. We gebruiken geen advertentietrackers of sessieopnamen. U kunt deze keuze wijzigen in Voorkeuren. Lees het Privacybeleid.
Quote this valuation with its source: Fair value, Potential value and the price at analysis.
FAQ
CSX — frequently asked questions
Is CSX Corporation overvalued?
In our latest published analysis dated 2026-09-09, CSX looks meaningfully overvalued. The price recorded at analysis is USD 49,0 versus our fair value of USD 24,1; the high endpoint is presented separately as potential value of USD 43,0. That implies roughly 50.7% downside to fair value at that date.
Our latest published report, analyzed 2026-09-09, gives CSX a fair value of USD 24,1 and a potential value of USD 43,0. The conclusion is triangulated across multiple valuation models and weighted by reliability for CSX Corporation's archetype; it is a dated research output, not a live price.
Should I buy CSX now?
Our latest published rating for CSX, analyzed 2026-09-09, is Sell. CSX Corporation looks meaningfully overvalued at the analysis-date price of USD 49,0 versus fair value of USD 24,1; potential value is USD 43,0. This is research for educational purposes, not personalized investment advice.
What are the biggest risks for CSX?
The dedicated bear-case section in our report analyzed 2026-09-09 documents CSX Corporation's material risks, evidence, thresholds, and thesis-invalidation conditions. Scenario-specific explanations remain in that section so the report does not repeat or decontextualize them elsewhere.
What is CSX's rating?
Our latest published rating for CSX, analyzed 2026-09-09, is Sell, with a published moat assessment of 1/10 (None). It reflects our fair value of USD 24,1, the potential value of USD 43,0, and the price recorded at analysis (USD 49,0).
Sell. The $49.00 report-date price sits above Fair value of $24.14 and Potential value of $43.01, so ordinary investors should reduce or exit exposure.3
The main risk is annual rail revenue growth at or below 0% in FY2027. That would weaken consolidated sales and the path to margin and free-cash-flow recovery.
Upside becomes more credible if rail sales grow in FY2027 and capital spending falls to no more than 1.5 times depreciation by FY2028. Sales growth would aid profit, while lower spending would release more owner cash.
Cycle upside
A demand-led upswing would support positive rail revenue, better use of the network and higher profit from each sales dollar. That would strengthen the recovery path.
Sell because the report-date price exceeds Potential value while later rail growth and capital normalization remain conditional.
Cycle upside
A demand-led upswing could keep annual rail revenue growth positive and support the recovery path. Annual rail revenue growth is the test because rail generated $13.28 billion in FY2025.6
Huisaanbeveling
Sell because the report-date price exceeds Potential value. Positive FY2027 rail growth and capex-to-depreciation of 1.5 times or less by FY2028 would improve the business case, but price versus value governs the action.
Bedrijfsoverzicht
CSX Corporation, together with its subsidiaries ("CSX" or the “Company”), based in Jacksonville, Florida, is one of the nation's leading transportation companies. The Company provides rail-based freight transportation services including traditional rail service, the transport of intermodal containers and trailers, as well as other transportation services such as rail-to-truck transfers and bulk commodity operations. •The intermodal business shipped 3.0 million units (48% of volume) and generated $2.1 billion in revenue (15% of revenue) in 2025. The intermodal business combines the superior economics of rail transportation with the flexibility of trucks and offers a cost and environmental advantage over long-haul trucking.
See the following page for a map of the CSX Rail Network. Also included on the map, "CSX Operating Agreement" indicates areas within which CSX can operate through trackage rights beyond the CSX network.
§2 BerenscenarioEN
Rail contraction would cut sales and operating leverage. A FY2030 margin below 31% would reduce profit from each sales dollar. Capex above 1.5 times depreciation by FY2028 would restrain owner cash. A discount-rate increase exceeding two points would lower the present value of future cash. FY2025 debt was $19.35 billion versus $670 million cash; both enter the bridge from enterprise value to equity value.
Rail provides most company revenue, so contraction would lower consolidated sales. FY2025 trucking revenue was much smaller than rail revenue, limiting its ability to offset that decline.
FY2025 rail revenue of $13.28 billion shows operating scale. It does not show whether customers face switching costs or whether the network has a lasting cost advantage. A durable competitive advantage cannot be established from this observation alone.
NSC and UNP are direct rail benchmarks. WAB is an equipment supplier, while BA is an aerospace company and only broad valuation context.
Economische winst
FY2025 operating profit and cash generation show that the business was profitable and produced operating cash. These are business outcomes, not tests of customer switching costs, network efficiency or lasting cost advantage.5
1/ 10
None
Bekende bedreigingen voor het concurrentievoordeel
Bedreiging
Ernst
Tijdlijn
Beperking
Direct rail competitors sustain better service, pricing or cost control.
high
Through FY2030
Direct rail competitors threaten CSX's service, pricing and cost position. Retire this threat only if CSX reaches at least a 35.3% operating margin by FY2028, closing the lower direct-peer margin gap. Capex-to-depreciation must also stay at or below 1.5 times by FY2028, showing the result was not bought with sustained excess spending.
Investment spending fails to create durable operating benefits.
high
Through FY2028
Investment spending threatens durable operating benefits when added assets do not release cash. Retire this threat only if capex-to-depreciation falls to 1.5 times or less by FY2028 and free cash flow improves without weaker rail revenue. That combination would show lower spending intensity is supporting cash rather than masking weaker operations.
The highlighted cell is Fair value when every assumption sits at its base level ($24.14). Each row and column shows what Fair value becomes when one assumption moves.
Free cash flow to the firm stays positive in the first projected year at $2.8B after modeled reinvestment of $993.8M, with terminal value at 71.9% of enterprise value. A sudden drop in free cash flow is not projected unless capital spending relative to revenue, reinvestment, or gross margin resets materially.
Operating margin reaches the Base endpoint by FY2030, while capital spending normalizes by FY2028.
Positive rail growth supports a measured recovery. This path fails if rail growth stalls, operating margin misses the Base endpoint, or investment intensity remains elevated through FY2028.
FY2025 operating cash of $4.61 billion exceeded reported profit of $2.89 billion. Capital spending was $2.90 billion and free cash flow was $1.71 billion. These one-year figures do not rank cash constraints.4,5
Kapitaalallocatie
FY2025 debt was $19.35 billion against $670 million of cash. This leaves less room for investment errors and makes equity value more sensitive to weaker cash generation.
CSX Corporation (CSX) trades at 21.9x forward earnings against a peer median of 22.9x. Its EV/EBITDA of 16.0x compares with a peer median of 15.8x. The comparison uses 4 peers: Norfolk Southern Corporation, Union Pacific Corporation, Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation and The Boeing Company, as of 2026-09-09.
§10 Sector & cyclusEN
Cyclusfase
Expansion
Capex rose from $2.26 billion in FY2023 to $2.53 billion in FY2024 and $2.90 billion in FY2025.5
Bullencyclus
A demand-led upswing could keep annual rail revenue growth positive and support the recovery path. Annual rail revenue growth is the test because rail generated $13.28 billion in FY2025.
Berencyclus
Rail generated $13.28 billion in FY2025, versus $839 million from trucking. This places the reported bear-cycle exposure in rail, but these segment values do not establish the timing or margin effect of a slowdown.
Seculaire trends
Trend
Impact
Notitie
Capital-intensive rail economics
neutral
The industry capex-to-depreciation benchmark was 1.63 times on 2026-09-01. This establishes capital intensity, not its future direction.
Positionering
The presented cycle view is demand-led. CSX's position depends on annual rail revenue growth remaining positive in FY2027.
§11 PositiebeheerEN
Positiegrootte
No new allocation is warranted while the report-date price remains above Potential value. Existing holders should reduce or exit.3
Risico
Each condition is independently sufficient to exit remaining exposure. Exit if FY2027 annual rail revenue growth is at or below 0%. Exit if capex-to-depreciation is above 1.5 times in FY2028. Also exit if WACC rises by more than 2 percentage points from 8.6171% within 12 months.
Entree-tranches
Niveau
Actie
Waarom
Above Potential value
Avoid initiating exposure.
The report-date price already exceeds the high end of the accepted public range.
This breach alone is sufficient to exit remaining exposure and reassess the revenue path because rail contraction would remove the supported route to later sales growth.
Analyst forecasts put FY2027 revenue at $15.94 billion and diluted EPS at $2.27. FY2025 capex was $2.90 billion, while free cash flow was $1.71 billion, leaving future cash improvement conditional.
§15Your notes
Capture your own thesis, position size, and follow-up questions. Stays on this device, only you can see it.
Private notes
Visible only to you. Synced to this device.
0 chars
Sources
The records this analysis drew on, as they stood when it was run.
Analyst consensusData as of 2026-09-09 · Published 2026-09-09 · Provider-adjusted · cited for 2 figuresCited in Scenario's, Eindaanbeveling
Macro and cost of capitalData as of 2026-09-09 · Published 2026-09-09 · cited for 1 figureCited in Berenscenario, Financiële historie
Not every cited input appears here: internal calculations and intermediate model outputs have no external record, and some citations could not be matched to one.
Failure to recover margin would leave less operating profit from each sales dollar, reducing after-tax cash and per-share earnings despite revenue growth.
A higher discount rate lowers the present value of future cash. FY2025 debt of $19.35 billion versus $670 million cash makes the equity claim more exposed to that decline.
Limitation: Terminal value is 71.9% of this model's value, above the 60% level at which the methodology flags concentration; the value leans on the years beyond the explicit forecast.
The higher outcome needs stronger operations and cash than Base. Persistent rail growth and a higher margin raise profit; lower investment spending must then turn more of that profit into free cash flow.
Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies CorporationWAB
Koers / reële waarde
Reële waardeUS$ 187,77Report-date priceUS$ 287,54
Beoordelingsdatum
ConcurrentievoordeelNarrow
Beleggingsscorekaart63 / 100
The Boeing CompanyBA
Koers / reële waarde
Reële waardeUS$ 134,94Report-date priceUS$ 193,56
Beoordelingsdatum
ConcurrentievoordeelNarrow
Beleggingsscorekaart46 / 100
Marge
CSX
CSX Corporation
$90.8B
21.9x
6.3x
16.0x
24.4%
—
NSC
Norfolk Southern Corporation
22.9x
5.9x
15.8x
17.0%
35.3%
UNP
Union Pacific Corporation
20.4x
6.7x
15.6x
39.7%
41.0%
WAB
Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation
22.9x
4.0x
20.5x
11.6%
19.2%
BA
The Boeing Company
51.1x
1.8x
173.5%
0.0%
Above 1.5 times in FY2028
This breach alone is sufficient to exit remaining exposure because persistent spending would keep reinvestment high and delay the expected free-cash-flow improvement.
More than 2 percentage points above the 8.6171% baseline within 12 months
This breach alone is sufficient to exit remaining exposure because a higher discount rate lowers the present value of future cash. FY2025 debt was $19.35 billion versus $670 million cash.3,5