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Bull: Unprecedented pricing power in MRO and prolonged legacy fleet utilization drive upside cash flows, yet shares still fail to justify the current $297 price.
internal valuation cross-checks of $350 aggressively extrapolate peak multiples.
As a pure-play aerospace and defense powerhouse, GE Aerospace commands a formidable moat with its dominant share of the commercial jet engine market. The high-margin, recurring aftermarket services model drives robust free cash flow generation, positioning GE as a high-quality mature compounder.
As a pure-play aerospace and defense powerhouse, GE Aerospace commands a formidable moat with its dominant share of the commercial jet engine market. The high-margin, recurring aftermarket services model drives robust free cash flow generation, positioning GE as a high-quality mature compounder.
Installed base of commercial engines drives captive aftermarket recurring .
Massive barriers to entry via extreme capital intensity and regulatory certification.
internal valuation cross-checks of $350 aggressively extrapolate peak multiples.
Fundamental value severely disconnects from the market price. Implied >14.5% 10-year growth is mathematically irreconcilable with mature aerospace terminal dynamics.
General Electric Company, doing business as GE Aerospace, designs and produces commercial and defense aircraft engines, integrated engine components, electric power, and aircraft systems. The company operates through two segments, Commercial Engines & Services, and Defense & Propulsion Technologies. The Commercial Engines & Services segment designs, develops, manufactures, maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) services of jet engines and sale of spare parts for commercial airframes, business aviation, and aeroderivative applications. The Defense & Propulsion Technologies designs, develops, manufactures, and services jet engines and avionics and power systems for governments, militaries, and commercial airframers, as well as MRO of engines and the sale of spare parts. This segment also offers aircraft components and systems, such as small turboprop engines, aeroengine mechanical transmissions, turbines, combustors and controls, additive manufacturing, propeller systems, ignition systems, sensors and engine accessories for fixed wing and rotorcraft applications for commercial and military end users under the Avio Aero, Unison, Dowty Propellers, and Colibrium Additive brands. The company operates in the United States, Europe, Asia, the Americas, the Middle East, and Africa. General Electric Company was incorporated in 1892 and is based in Evendale, Ohio.
A severe global macroeconomic contraction reduces air traffic, stalling new aircraft deliveries and delaying high-margin aftermarket shop visits. Concurrently, entrenched supply chain constraints prevent timely engine builds, fracturing free cash flow conversion.
Airlines delay fleet upgrades and shop visits due to macro weakness. Supply chain friction destroys near-term operating leverage, forcing severe multiple contraction.
LEAP engine aftermarket margins structurally fail to reach legacy peaks due to higher durability costs.
A severe economic downturn curbs commercial air travel volume, deferring lucrative overhaul events.
De vijf ontwikkelingen die onze beleggingsthese zouden verzwakken.
Declining commercial flight departures and deferred airline engine overhauls reduce high-margin aftermarket spare part volume, weakening the primary structural cash generation engine of the business.
Huidig:18.5% for the period ended 2025-12-31
Waarschuwing alsDecelerates below 6.0% over any fiscal year
Installed base of commercial engines drives captive aftermarket recurring revenue.
Massive barriers to entry via extreme capital intensity and regulatory certification.
Oligopolistic dynamics (GE/CFM vs. peers) ensure rational long-term pricing.
Economic profit is supported when reported returns exceed the company cost-of-capital hurdle.
Each lens answers a different valuation question. Only included lenses set Fair value; floors and diagnostics provide context.
Unavailable
FCFF DCF remains positive at the base case: base FCFF $9.3B after capex $1.2B, with terminal value at 58.2% of enterprise value. No FCF cliff is projected unless capex/revenue or gross margin materially resets.
Unprecedented pricing power in MRO and prolonged legacy fleet utilization drive upside cash flows, yet shares still fail to justify the current $297 price.
If aftermarket margins surpass expectations and supply chains unfreeze, expect stock momentum to persist. If MRO volumes miss due to air traffic softness, severe multiple contraction will occur toward intrinsic base.
If aftermarket margins surpass expectations and supply chains unfreeze, expect stock momentum to persist. If MRO volumes miss due to air traffic softness, severe multiple contraction will occur toward intrinsic base.
If aftermarket margins surpass expectations and supply chains unfreeze, expect stock momentum to persist. If MRO volumes miss due to air traffic softness, severe multiple contraction will occur toward intrinsic base.
If aftermarket margins surpass expectations and supply chains unfreeze, expect stock momentum to persist. If MRO volumes miss due to air traffic softness, severe multiple contraction will occur toward intrinsic base.
Warning level: Decelerates below 6.0% over any fiscal year. Declining commercial flight departures and deferred airline engine overhauls reduce high-margin aftermarket spare part volume, weakening the primary structural cash generation engine of the business.
Warning level: Falls below 15.0% over any trailing twelve-month period. Higher durability rectification expenses and negative production mix on new engine deliveries compress operating profitability, slowing corporate earnings compounding and depressing return on capital.
Capital allocation should be evaluated against reinvestment needs, balance-sheet strength, and shareholder returns.
| Omzet | 45.855.000.000 |
|---|---|
| Kostprijs van de omzet | 31.417.000.000 |
| Brutowinst | 14.438.000.000 |
| Bedrijfskosten | 5.758.000.000 |
| Bedrijfsresultaat | 8.680.000.000 |
| Niet-operationele posten en belastingen | 24.000.000 |
| Nettowinst | 8.704.000.000 |
| Totale activa | 130.169.000.000 |
|---|---|
| Liquide middelen | 12.392.000.000 |
| Vlottende activa | 40.595.000.000 |
| Totale verplichtingen | 111.271.000.000 |
| Kortlopende verplichtingen | 38.981.000.000 |
| Eigen vermogen | 18.677.000.000 |
Financiële momentopname gebruikt in de analyse van 2026-05-08.
| Periode | Omzet | EBITDA | Nettowinst | Operationele kasstroom | Vrije kasstroom | Investeringen | Afschrijvingen en amortisatie | Aandelenbeloning | Aandeleninkoop | Betaalde dividenden | Netto schuldemissie | Investeringskasstroom | Financieringskasstroom | Beginstand liquide middelen | Eindstand liquide middelen | Kas en beleggingen | Totale schuld | Operationele marge | ROIC | WACC | ROIC−WACC-spread |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2022-12-31 | 29,1 mld. | 4 mld. | 336 mln. | 5,9 mld. | 5,3 mld. | 662 mln. | 1,2 mld. | — | 1,2 mld. | 639 mln. | -11 mld. | — | — | — | — | 15,8 mld. | 26,1 mld. | 12,3% | — | 7,6% | — |
| 2023-12-31 | 35,3 mld. | 12,6 mld. | 9,5 mld. | 5,2 mld. | 4,3 mld. | 862 mln. | 1,2 mld. | — | 7 mld. | 589 mln. | -3,4 mld. | — | — | — | — | 15,2 mld. | 20,5 mld. | 13,3% | — | 8,6% | — |
| 2024-12-31 | 38,7 mld. | 9,8 mld. | 6,6 mld. | 4,7 mld. | 3,7 mld. | 1 mld. | 1,2 mld. | — | 5,8 mld. | 1 mld. | -786 mln. | — | — | — | — | 13,6 mld. | 19,3 mld. | 17,5% | — | 9,3% | — |
| 2025-12-31 | 45,9 mld. | 12,1 mld. | 8,7 mld. | 8,5 mld. | 7,3 mld. | 1,3 mld. | 1,2 mld. | — | 7,6 mld. | 1,5 mld. | 199 mln. | — | — | — | — | 12,4 mld. | 20,5 mld. | 18,9% | — | 9,0% | — |
GE trades at 34.3x forward earnings against a peer median of 23.4x; EV/EBITDA of 29.6x against a peer median of 17.1x; 6 peers.
Intensely capital-heavy development cycles phase into high-cash-flow harvesting periods once an engine platform achieves mass.
Aged global fleets force prolonged usage of legacy aircraft, accelerating high-margin MRO events while backlogs for new equipment expand.
Airlines aggressively retire legacy fleets during economic contractions, destroying the captive aftermarket revenue base prematurely.
Intensely capital-heavy development cycles phase into high-cash-flow harvesting periods once an engine platform achieves mass.
Zero. Sell.
Liquidate existing positions to harvest peak-cycle multiples. A 34x forward P/E on a mature aerospace industrial is mathematically unsustainable.
internal valuation cross-checks of $350 aggressively extrapolate peak multiples.
Intrinsic models cap terminal valuation at 20x, yielding $184.
Sell. GE Aerospace is a high-quality compounder trading at a severe speculative premium. Market pricing demands impossible 14.5% perpetual growth. Capitalize on the divergence.
Downside case: internal valuation cross-checks of $350 aggressively extrapolate peak multiples.
Capture your own thesis, position size, and follow-up questions. Stays on this device, only you can see it.
Persistent raw material constraints throttle deliveries indefinitely, breaking capital compounding.
Higher durability rectification expenses and negative production mix on new engine deliveries compress operating profitability, slowing corporate earnings compounding and depressing return on capital.
Huidig:18.9% for the period ended 2025-12-31
Waarschuwing alsFalls below 15.0% over any trailing twelve-month period
Substantial warranty claim settlements and working capital absorption from unbilled maintenance contracts drain cash liquidity, compromising shareholder returns and disciplined capital allocation.
Huidig:0.981 as of the 2026-05-08 analysis date
Waarschuwing alsFalls below 0.80x over any trailing twelve-month period
Unhedged input cost escalation and aerospace supply chain bottlenecks erode gross profitability across long-term service agreements, reducing manufacturing gross margins and contracting operational cash generation.
Huidig:31.5% for the period ended 2025-12-31
Waarschuwing alsDeclines below 28.0% over any fiscal year
Global commercial aviation fleet groundings and lower airline passenger load factors curb engine utilization hours, degrading asset turnover and shrinking capital productivity.
Huidig:21.9% as of the 2026-05-08 analysis date
Waarschuwing alsDrops below 16.0% over any trailing twelve-month period
| Monitor the threat against the report checkpoints. |
| Slower realization of LEAP engine aftermarket margins compared to legacy platforms. | medium | Monitor | Monitor the threat against the report checkpoints. |
Under the moderate discount rate, US$ 62,90 comes from forecast-period earnings and US$ 73,25 from the long-term value, totaling US$ 136.
Project EPS through the explicit advantage period, fade growth as competition catches up, and discount the full stream at cost of equity.
Apply a terminal P/E to the dated forward EPS path, then discount that future share value back to the analysis date.
Convert the revenue and margin path into after-tax free cash flow, discount the annual per-share amounts and terminal value at WACC, then adjust for signed net debt per current share.
Add depreciation to net income, subtract maintenance capex, divide by diluted shares, and apply a normalized valuation multiple.
Multiply the peer median PEG by this stock's forecast growth to derive an implied forward P/E, then apply it to forward EPS.
Solve for the growth rate that makes the model value equal the report-date share price.
Steady aerospace cycle recovery continues, but current market exuberance reverses as terminal growth normalizes. The implied 14.5% perpetual growth is rejected.
Warning level: Falls below 0.80x over any trailing twelve-month period. Substantial warranty claim settlements and working capital absorption from unbilled maintenance contracts drain cash liquidity, compromising shareholder returns and disciplined capital allocation.
Warning level: Declines below 28.0% over any fiscal year. Unhedged input cost escalation and aerospace supply chain bottlenecks erode gross profitability across long-term service agreements, reducing manufacturing gross margins and contracting operational cash generation.
Warning level: Drops below 16.0% over any trailing twelve-month period. Global commercial aviation fleet groundings and lower airline passenger load factors curb engine utilization hours, degrading asset turnover and shrinking capital productivity.
| Marge |
|---|
| GE | GE Aerospace | $310.5B | 34.3x | 6.4x | 29.6x | — | — |
| RTX | RTX Corporation | 23.4x | 2.6x | 17.8x | 11.6% | 13.2% | |
| BA | The Boeing Company | 53.9x | 2.0x | -64.9x | 169.9% | 1.7% | |
| LMT | Lockheed Martin Corporation | 16.0x | 1.6x | 17.1x | 67.6% | 11.0% | |
| HWM | Howmet Aerospace Inc. | 48.4x | 13.2x | 44.1x | 30.4% | 26.3% | |
| GD | General Dynamics Corporation | 19.3x | 1.7x | 15.4x | 18.0% | 10.5% |
